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Abstract—In this paper, the impact of network-state knowledge
on the feasibility of secrecy is studied in the context of non-
colluding active eavesdropping. The main contribution is the
investigation of several scenarios in which increasing the available
knowledge at each of the network components leads to some
paradoxical observations in terms of the average secrecy capacity
and average information leakage. These observations are in
the context of a broadcast channel similar to the time-division
downlink of a single-cell cellular system. Here, providing more
knowledge to the eavesdroppers makes them more conservative
in their attacks, and thus, less harmful in terms of average
information leakage. Similarly, providing more knowledge to the
transmitter makes it more careful and less willing to transmit,
which reduces the expected secrecy capacity. These findings are
illustrated with a numerical analysis that shows the impact of
most of the network parameters in the feasibility of secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the feasibility of secrecy in the context
of the downlink of a single-cell cellular system with legitimate
and malicious receivers and time-division multiple access. At
each time slot, the transmitter decides whether to send infor-
mation to the receiver with the highest reported signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR) or to remain silent. Legitimate receivers report
their true SNRs to the transmitters such that the destination
selection can take place. Conversely, malicious receivers report
a false SNR in order to increase the probability of successful
interception of the transmitted data. Reporting a lower SNR
than the actual value results in avoiding being selected as the
destination, and thus this enables eavesdropping. Reporting a
higher value than the actual SNR favors being selected as the
destination and therefore, it prevents private information from
being sent to legitimate receivers. This problem was introduced
in [1] and [2] in the context of active eavesdropping [3]–[7],
however the impact of network-state knowledge at each of
the network components was not treated. In this paper, the
analysis is focused on the importance of the amount of network
state knowledge made available to all the network components
for them to determine their own strategies. This paper revisits
the results presented in [8] and provides numerical examples
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to highlight the importance of the tradeoffs between network
knowledge and the feasibility of secrecy.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a transmitter communicating with a set of destina-
tions D = K∪J , following a time-division policy. The desti-
nations in the set K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} are legitimate receivers,
while the destinations in the set J = {K + 1, . . . ,K + J}
are malicious receivers. At every channel use, the transmitter
sends information to receiver i∗ ∈ D. When the destination is a
legitimate receiver, i.e., i∗ ∈ K, all malicious receivers j ∈ J
attempt to eavesdrop upon the communication. At every block
interval, for all i ∈ D, the message index mi ∈Mi is encoded
into a codeword xi = (xi,1, . . . , xi,Ni) ∈ Ci, where Mi and
Ci denote respectively the set of messages and the codebook
of the link transmitter-receiver i. For all ` ∈ {1, . . . , Ni}, xi,`
are complex and subject to the constraint 1NiE [x
∗
ixi] 6 P¯ ,
with P¯ the average transmit power. The input to receiver i
during a given block is denoted by yi = (yi,1, . . . , yi,Ni) and
yi = hixi∗ + zi, (1)
where the noise vector is zi = (zi,1, . . . , zi,Ni); the
noise components zi,1, . . . , zi,Ni and the channel coefficients
h1, . . . , hK+J are independent circularly symmetric complex
Gaussian (CSCG) random variables with zero means and unit
variances. The secrecy capacity between the transmitter and
a legitimate receiver k ∈ K with respect to an eavesdropper
j ∈ J , can be written as follows [9]:
Cs(k, j)=
(
log(1 + SNRk)− log(1 + SNRj)
)+
, (2)
where SNRi = |hi|2P¯ , for all i ∈ D. The maximum
information leakage rate at eavesdropper j with respect to a
legitimate receiver k is denoted by Ls(k, j) and is given by
Ls(k, j)=log(1 + SNRj). (3)
By assumption Ls(i, j) = 0 and Cs(i, j) = 0 when i ∈ J ,
since the case in which malicious receivers eavesdrop upon
malicious receivers is not taken into account as explained in
the following.
A. Transmitter’s Behavior
At each channel use, the transmitter aims to send informa-
tion to the receiver for which reliable decoding at the highest
achievable secrecy rate is guaranteed. As the transmitter is
not able to distinguish a legitimate receiver from a malicious
receiver, it simply exploits the multi-user diversity and chooses
the receiver i∗ with the highest SNR as the destination. The
choices of the transmitter are either to transmit with positive
power to destination i∗ (P¯ = P > 0), if secrecy can be
ensured, or to remain silent (P¯ = 0), if information leakage
might take place. The transmitter obtains the SNRs from all
the receivers in advance using regular signaling channels. The
vector of reported SNRs is denoted by γ = (γ1, . . . , γK+L),
where γi denotes the SNR reported by receiver i. Then, the
index i∗ is such that
i∗ = arg max
i∈D
γi. (4)
The secrecy capacity at which the transmitter can send infor-
mation is Cs(i∗, j∗) where j∗ is the index of the eavesdropper
with the highest potential of eavesdropping [2]:
j∗ = arg max
j∈J
γj . (5)
B. Receiver’s Behavior
1) Legitimate Receivers: Legitimate receivers always report
the actual values of their SNRs, that is γk = SNRk, ∀k ∈ K.
2) Malicious Receivers: All malicious receivers j ∈ J aim
to eavesdrop upon the communication between the transmit-
ter and a legitimate destination. To achieve this, receiver j
does not report its true SNR. It adds an error  such that
γj = SNRj + , and  ∈ {ˆ, ˇ}, with ˆ > 0 and ˇ < 0.
Note that the exact values of ˆ and ˇ are arbitrarily chosen
by the eavesdroppers and can be different at each block. More
specifically, eavesdropper j might choose the values ˆj and ˇj .
However, as shown below, only the actions of the eavesdropper
j∗ influence the behavior of the transmitter. Hence, no indices
are used for the values ˆ and ˇ in the following. When
SNRj∗ is the highest SNR in the network, eavesdropper j∗
can eavesdrop upon the destination i∗, if this eavesdropper is
not chosen as the destination during that time interval. Hence,
it reports a lower SNR γj∗ = SNRj∗ + ˇ. In this way, it
forces the transmitter to send private information to another
receiver more susceptible to eavesdropping. Alternatively, if
SNRj∗ is not the highest SNR, then its interest is to be
selected as the destination such that no private information
is sent to other receivers. Note that when a malicious receiver
is chosen as the destination after reporting an enhanced SNR,
the transmitter might send information at a secrecy rate that
cannot be reliably decoded by the destination. Thus, the only
objective of the malicious receivers is to eavesdrop upon the
legitimate receivers instead of receiving their own information.
C. Network States and Available Knowledge
1) Network States: The global state of the network can be
described in terms of the events A and B.
Event A: eavesdropper j∗ is able to eavesdrop, i.e.,
SNRj∗ > SNRi∗ ; and event B: eavesdropper j∗ is able to
trick the transmitter, i.e.,
ˆ >
∣∣SNRi∗ − SNRj∗ ∣∣ and ˇ < −∣∣(SNRi∗ − SNRj∗)∣∣.(6)
The feasibility of eavesdropping depends on the events A and
B. In state (A,B) eavesdropping is feasible as SNRj∗ >
SNRi∗ , however, it might not necessarily occur. For in-
stance, if eavesdropper j∗ plays ˆ, the transmitter chooses
the malicious receiver j∗ as the destination and no private
information crosses the channel. Alternatively, if j∗ plays
ˇ a legitimate receiver might be chosen as the destination
and thus, eavesdropping occurs. In state (A, B¯), eavesdropper
j∗ is chosen as the destination. This is basically because,
eavesdropper j∗ has the highest SNR and it cannot trick
the transmitter. In (A¯, B), the eavesdropper j∗ can at most
mislead the destination selection but cannot eavesdrop since
SNRj∗ < SNRi∗ . In the state (A¯, B¯), a legitimate destination
is always selected and strictly positive secrecy rate can be
guaranteed as SNRj∗ < SNRi∗ and none of the eavesdroppers
can trick the destination selection process.
2) Available Knowledge: A knowledge state (KS) of re-
ceiver i (resp. the transmitter) describes the set variables that
are known by receiver i (resp. the transmitter). As shown in
the next section, the KS of each network element determines
its optimal behavior.
a) Transmitter’s KS: The transmitter is aware of the
presence of active eavesdroppers and possesses estimates of
the values of ˆ and ˇ using standard tools [10]. However, the
transmitter is assumed to be unable to distinguish a legitimate
receiver from a malicious receiver and to know whether in
the current channel use, it chooses  = ˆ or  = ˇ. Thus,
two KSs are considered for the transmitter: ω(0)Tx and ω
(1)
Tx .
At ω(0)Tx , the transmitter does not know the exact values of
K and J , even though it knows the value of K + J . Thus,
it cannot determine exactly which state, out of all 4 possible
states, is the current state of the network. Therefore, from
the principle of maximum entropy [11], the beliefs over the
network states induced by KS ω(0)Tx are uniformly distributed,
i.e., Pr
Ä
·, ·|ω(0)Tx
ä
= 14 .
At ω(1)Tx , the transmitter knows the exact values of K and J
and it knows the distribution of the channel realizations. Thus,
the beliefs induced by this KS are
Pr
Ä
A,B|ω(1)Tx
ä
=Pr (SNRj∗ + ˇ 6 SNRk∗ < SNRj∗) ,
Pr
Ä
A, B¯|ω(1)Tx
ä
=Pr (SNRk∗ < SNRj∗ + ˇ) ,
Pr
Ä
A¯, B|ω(1)Tx
ä
=Pr (SNRj∗ 6 SNRk∗ < SNRj∗ + ˆ) ,
Pr
Ä
A¯, B¯|ω(1)Tx
ä
=Pr (SNRj∗ + ˆ 6 SNRk∗) ,
where j∗ is defined by (5) and
k∗ = arg max
k∈K
SNRk. (7)
The probability is taken with respect to the distributions of
the random variables |hk∗ |2 and |hj∗ |2 which are the K-
th and the J-th order statistics of a set of K and a set of
J samples of independent random variables following a chi-
square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, respectively.
b) Malicious Receivers’ KS: A malicious receiver j
has two KSs: ω(0)Rx and ω
(1)
Rx . At ω
(0)
Rx , malicious receivers
completely ignore the number K of legitimate destinations.
Hence, there is no other knowledge available to make a better
guess about the network state than a uniform probability
distribution [11]. Thus, the beliefs induced by this KS are
Pr
Ä
·, ·|ω(0)Rx
ä
= 14 . At ω
(1)
Rx , malicious receivers know the exact
number of legitimate receivers K and the distributions of the
channels. Therefore, the belief induced by this knowledge state
is the following:
Pr
Ä
A,B|ω(1)Rx
ä
=Pr
(
SNRj∗ + ˇ < SNRk∗ < SNRj∗
∣∣∣|hj∗ |2) ,
Pr
Ä
A, B¯|ω(1)Rx
ä
=Pr
(
SNRk∗ < SNRj∗ + ˆ
∣∣∣|hj∗ |2) ,
Pr
Ä
A¯, B|ω(1)Rx
ä
=Pr
(
SNRj∗ < SNRk∗ < SNRj∗ + ˆ
∣∣∣|hj∗ |2) ,
Pr
Ä
A¯, B¯|ω(1)Rx
ä
=Pr
(
SNRj∗ + ˆ < SNRk∗
∣∣∣|hj∗ |2) ,
where j∗ and k∗ are defined by (5) and (7), respectively. The
probability is taken with respect to the distribution of the
random variable |hk∗ |2. Here, the channel coefficient |h∗j |2
and thus, the SNR∗j , are known by receiver j
∗.
III. EXISTING RESULTS
In [8], the interaction between the transmitter and the
malicious receivers during a sufficiently large number of
independent blocks is modeled by a Bayesian game [12]. In
this game, the objectives of the transmitter and the eaves-
dropper are respectively denoted by uTx : {0, P} × {ˆ, ˇ}2 ×
{ω(0)Tx , ω(1)Tx} → R and uRx : {0, P}2×{ˆ, ˇ}×{ω(0)Rx , ω(1)Rx} →
R. More specifically, the objective of the transmitter is to
maximize the expectation of a given function u with respect
to its individual beliefs. Such a function u models its aim
to transmitting private information to the legitimate receivers.
Conversely, the objective of the eavesdroppers is to minimize
the expected value of the function u given its own individual
beliefs. The function u : {0, P¯} × {ˆ, ˇ} can be any function
that is positive only when the transmitter sends information
and the eavesdropper j∗ is unable to extract any private
information from its received signal yj∗ , i.e., P > 0 and
SNRi∗ > SNRj∗ + . Alternatively, u is negative when the
transmitter sends information and the eavesdropper j∗ is able
to at least partially decode the private message, i.e., P > 0,
SNRi∗ < SNRj∗ and SNRi∗ > SNRj∗ + . Finally, u is zero
when the transmitter sends information to the eavesdropper j∗,
i.e., P > 0 and SNRj∗ +  > SNRi∗ ; or when the transmitter
decides not to transmit, i.e., P¯ = 0. One example for the
function u is provided in [8], where
u (P, )=log
Å
1 + SNRi∗
1 + SNRj∗
ã
1{SNRi∗>SNRj∗+}. (8)
Therefore, the objective functions uTx and uRx are
uTx(P, , ωTx) =∑
(a,b)∈{A,A¯}×{B,B¯}
Pr (a, b|ωTx) (u(P, 0) + u(P, 1)) , and
uRx(P , , ωRx) =∑
(a,b)∈{A,A¯}×{B,B¯}
Pr (a, b|ωRx) (u(P0, ) + u(P1, )) ,
respectively. The vector  =
(
0, 1
)
is such that 0 and 1
are the error terms used by the eavesdropper Rx when it is
at KS ω(0)Rx (it does not know K) and KS ω
(1)
Rx (it knows K),
respectively. The vector P =
(
P0, P1
)
is such that P0 and
P1 are the average powers at KS ω
(0)
Tx (it does not know K
and J) and KS ω(1)Tx (it knows K and J), respectively. An
interesting outcome of the game G is a Bayesian equilibrium
(BE) [13]. At a BE, each player adopts an action for each of
its possible knowledge states that is optimal with respect to
the actions adopted by the other player at any of its knowledge
states. Here, the optimality of the actions of one player is with
respect to its individual beliefs. More formally, a BE can be
defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Bayesian Equilibrium [13]): The action pro-
files P ∗ = (P ∗0 , P
∗
1 ) and 
∗ =
(
∗0, 
∗
1
)
are a Bayesian
equilibrium of the game G, if ∀(m,n) ∈ {0, 1}2 and ∀P =(
P0, P1
) ∈ {0, P}2, it holds that
uTx(P
∗
n , 
∗, ω(n)Tx ) > uTx(Pn, ∗, ω
(n)
Tx ), (9)
and ∀ = (0, 1) ∈ {ˆ, ˇ}2,
uRx(P
∗, ∗m, ω
(m)
Rx ) > uRx(P ∗, m, ω
(m)
Rx ). (10)
The expected secrecy capacity and expected secrecy leakage
observed at a BE is fully characterized in [8]. For the sake of
completeness, these results are reproduced in Theorem 1, on
the next page.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
A. On the Impact of the Available Knowledge
From Theorem 1, for all m ∈ {0, 1} it follows that
C¯s(ω
(m)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx)>C¯s(ω
(m)
Tx , ω
(1)
Rx), and
L¯s(ω
(m)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx)>L¯s(ω
(m)
Tx , ω
(1)
Rx) = 0. (11)
This implies that, independently of the knowledge available
for the transmitter, providing more knowledge to the malicious
receivers strongly decreases the secrecy capacity, which agrees
with intuition. However, paradoxically, more knowledge also
implies a zero information leakage rate. That is, no eavesdrop-
ping occurs when malicious receivers are more knowledgeable
about the network. Indeed, more knowledge forces the eaves-
droppers to preferably play ˆ. Hence, either a legitimate re-
ceiver is chosen as the destination and strictly positive secrecy
rate is guaranteed (SNRk∗ > SNRj∗ + ˆ); or an eavesdropper
is chosen as the destination (SNRj∗ + ˆ > SNRk∗ ), which
implies that no private information traverses the channel.
Theorem 1 (Secrecy Rate with Active Eavesdroppers): Let ξ ∈ [0, 1] and 1−ξ be the probabilities with which the eavesdroppers
use their negative ˇ and positive ˆ error terms, respectively. Let also C¯s(ω
(m)
Tx , ω
(n)
Rx ) and L¯s(ω
(m)
Tx , ω
(n)
Rx ) denote the expected
secrecy capacity and the expected information leakage at the Bayesian equilibrium of the game G when the transmitter and
the eavesdroppers have the knowledge state ω(m)Tx and ω
(n)
Rx , with (m,n) ∈ {0, 1}2, respectively. Then,
C¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx)=ξ
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
α
log
Å
1 + λP
1 + αP
ã
dF|hk∗ |2(λ)dF|hj∗ |2(α) + (1− ξ)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
α+ ˆP
log
Å
1 + λP
1 + αP
ã
dF|hk∗ |2(λ)dF|hj∗ |2(α),
L¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx)=ξ
∫ ∞
0
∫ λ− ˇP
0
log (1 + αP ) dF|hj∗ |2(α)dF|hk∗ |2(λ),
C¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(1)
Rx)=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
α+ ˆP
log
Å
1 + λP
1 + αP
ã
dF|hk∗ |2(λ)dF|hj∗ |2(α)
L¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(1)
Rx)=0
C¯s(ω
(1)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx)=
®
C¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx) if Pr (SNRj∗ 6 SNRk∗) > Pr (SNRj∗ + ˇ 6 SNRk∗ < SNRj∗)
0 otherwise
L¯s(ω
(1)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx)=
®
L¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx) if Pr (SNRj∗ 6 SNRk∗) > Pr (SNRj∗ + ˇ 6 SNRk∗ < SNRj∗)
0 otherwise
C¯s(ω
(1)
Tx , ω
(1)
Rx)=
®
C¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(1)
Rx) if Pr (SNRj∗ 6 SNRk∗) > Pr (SNRj∗ + ˇ 6 SNRk∗ < SNRj∗)
0 otherwise
L¯s(ω
(1)
Tx , ω
(1)
Rx)=0,
where i∗ and k∗ are defined by (4) and (5), respectively. The functions F|hk∗ |2 and F|hj∗ |2 are the respective cumulative
probability distributions of the random variables |hk∗ |2 and |hj∗ |2.
This explains the reduction of the secrecy capacity: legitimate
transmitters become less likely to be chosen as destinations.
A similar counter-intuitive effect is observed at the trans-
mitter. From Theorem 1, for all n ∈ {0, 1} it follows that,
C¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(n)
Rx )>C¯s(ω
(1)
Tx , ω
(n)
Rx ), and (12)
L¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(n)
Rx )>L¯s(ω
(1)
Tx , ω
(n)
Rx ). (13)
This implies that independently of the KS m of the ma-
licious receivers, providing more knowledge to the trans-
mitters reduces the expected secrecy capacity. This is
observed because the transmitter becomes less willing
to transmit. Bayesian inference implies that not trans-
mitting any private information is safer depending on
the number of legitimate and malicious receivers. In-
deed, under the condition that Pr (SNRj∗ 6 SNRk∗) <
Pr (SNRj∗ + ˇ 6 SNRk∗ < SNRj∗), the transmitter does not
transmit at all. This conservative behavior also explains the
reduction in the information leakage rate, which is on the
contrary a more intuitive observation.
B. On the Impact of the Signal to Noise Ratio
From Theorem 1, the following holds in the high SNR
regime (P →∞), for all (m,n) ∈ {0, 1}2:
lim
P→∞
R¯s(ω
(m)
Tx , ω
(n)
Rx ) =
ξ
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
α
log
Å
λ
α
ã
dF|hi∗ |2(λ)dF|hj∗ |2(α)
and
lim
P→∞
L¯s(ω
(m)
Tx , ω
(n)
Rx ) =
ξ
∫ ∞
0
∫ λ
0
log (1 + αP ) dF|hj∗ |2(α)F|hi∗ |2(λ),
which implies that in the high SNR regime, independently
of the available knowledge at the transmitter or receivers,
a strictly positive secrecy capacity is guaranteed only if the
malicious receivers use the negative error term ˇ, at least a
fraction ξ > 0 of all channel uses. The same is required for
observing a strictly positive expected information leakage rate.
This evokes the fact that the best performance for an active
eavesdropper in the high SNR regime is to behave as a passive
eavesdropper, i.e., avoiding to be chosen as the destination
(ξ = 1). This coincides with the performance achieved at the
Nash equilibrium when the transmitter and the receivers play
with complete information [2].
C. On the Impact of the Additive Error ˆ and ˇ
When eavesdroppers ignore the number of legitimate re-
ceivers (KS ω(0)Rx ), either a positive or negative additive error
is indifferently used. This is basically because in expectation,
both actions yield the same utility given their beliefs. Hence,
if the probability of using a negative error term is denoted by
ξ, it follows that ξ → 0 implies that
C¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx)→C¯s(ω(0)Tx , ω(1)Rx) > 0, and (14)
L¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx)→L¯s(ω(0)Tx , ω(1)Rx) = 0, (15)
and moreover, C¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx) becomes monotonically decreas-
ing with ˆ, as shown in Fig. 1 (top). That is, eavesdroppers
would choose a large value of ˆ in order to reduce the average
secrecy capacity. Indeed, a sufficiently large value of ˆ might
reduce the secrecy capacity to zero. However, large values
of ˆ can also lead the transmitter to be suspicious about the
malicious nature of the eavesdroppers and thus, be removed
from the network. On the contrary, ξ → 1 implies that
C¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx) achieves a maximum that is independent of the
value of ˆ and, at the same time, L¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx) achieves a
maximum that is dependent on ˇ < 0. The smaller ˇ, the larger
is the leakage L¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx), as shown in Fig. 1 (bottom).
This is basically because a small ˇ reduces the likelihood of
a malicious receiver to be chosen as the destination and thus,
more private information crosses the wireless channel, thereby
increasing the possibility of eavesdropping.
Finally, it is worth highlighting that when eavesdroppers
know the value of K (KS ω(1)Rx ), they do not use the negative
error term at all, as the Bayesian inference induces the beliefs
that their individual SNRs are most likely lower than the
highest SNR of the legitimate receivers. Therefore, malicious
receivers always play ˆ to prohibit the transmitter from choos-
ing legitimate receivers as the destination.
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Fig. 1. Average secrecy capacity C¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx ) (Top) and average leakage
L¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx ) (Bottom) as a function of
ˆ
SNRj∗
, with K = J = 5 and j∗
given by (5).
D. On the Impact of the Number of Legitimate Users and
Eavesdroppers
From Theorem 1, it can be concluded that when the
transmitter knows the number of eavesdroppers (KS ω(1)Tx ),
its transmission (P¯ > 0) is subject to the satisfaction of the
condition
Pr (SNRj∗ 6 SNRk∗)>Pr (SNRj∗ + ˇ 6 SNRk∗ < SNRj∗) .
(16)
Condition (16) verifies whether the probability of sending
information with a strictly positive secrecy rate to a legitimate
destination (SNRj∗ 6 SNRk∗) is higher than the probability
of sending private information to a legitimate destination
when a strictly positive secrecy rate is unfeasible and the
eavesdropper with the highest SNR j∗ is able to trick the
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Fig. 3. Average leakage L¯s(ω
(0)
Tx , ω
(0)
Rx ) as a function of the number of
eavesdroppers J and the number of legitimate users K, when P = 0 dB,
ξ = 1 and ˆ = 1
2
SNRj∗ .
transmitter by reporting a degraded SNR (SNRj∗ + ˇ 6
SNRk∗ < SNRj∗ ). That is, condition (16) verifies whether the
utility function of the transmitter in the corresponding game
in [8] is strictly positive while playing P¯ = P > 0, given its
own beliefs. It is important to highlight that if ˇ can be written
as a fraction of the SNRj∗ , condition (16) is independent
of the transmit power and depends only on the value of ˇ,
the number of legitimate transmitters K and eavesdroppers
J , as the expectation is taken over the distributions of the
channel realizations hi∗ and hj∗ . Fig. 4 plots ∆(K,J) =
Pr (SNRj∗ 6 SNRk∗)−Pr (SNRj∗ + ˇ 6 SNRk∗ < SNRj∗)
as a function of the number of eavesdroppers J and the
number of legitimate users K, when ˇ = 12SNRj∗ . Note
that (16) is satisfied, i.e., ∆(K,J) > 0, when the number of
eavesdroppers J and legitimate users K satisfy the condition
K > max (1, J − 3) , (17)
for this particular value of ˇ = 12SNRj∗ . Hence, when
the number of legitimate transmitters exceeds by three the
number of eavesdroppers, the transmitter sends information to
destination i∗, which guarantees positive secrecy capacity on
average. This also verifies that condition (16) can be evaluated
by the transmitter at the KS ω(1)Tx as it depends on parameters
whose values are known at such knowledge state.
Interestingly, note that when the SNR is arbitrarily increased
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Fig. 4. ∆(K, J) as a function of the number of eavesdroppers J and the
number of legitimate users K, with ∆(K, J) = Pr
(
SNRj∗ 6 SNRk∗
)
−
Pr
(
SNRj∗ + ˇ 6 SNRk∗ < SNRj∗
)
and ˇ = 1
2
SNRj∗ .
while the error term ˇ is kept constant, condition (16) is always
satisfied. Hence, in the high SNR regime (P → ∞), the
transmitter is always able to transmit at a positive secrecy
rate. Nonetheless, if the error terms are both dynamically
adjusted by the eavesdroppers according to their actual SNRs,
increasing the SNR does not provide any additional robustness
against the actions of the eavesdroppers.
When the transmitter decides to send information to receiver
i∗, either because it is at knowledge state ω(0)Tx or because it
is at knowledge state ω(1)Tx and condition (16) is satisfied, the
average secrecy rate is always strictly positive. As shown in
Fig. 2, the average secrecy capacity increases monotonically
with the number of legitimate receivers. This is due to the
fact that a higher number of legitimate transmitters increases
the likelihood of choosing a legitimate transmitter i∗ ∈ K as
the destination and ensuring a strictly positive secrecy rate
(SNRj∗ < SNRk∗). Alternatively, increasing the number of
eavesdroppers increases the probability that an eavesdropper
will be chosen as the destination, which avoids the transmis-
sion of private information. This is the reason why the average
secrecy capacity decreases with ˆ and is independent of ˇ.
Conversely to the average secrecy capacity, the informa-
tion leakage increases with both the number of legitimate
transmitters and eavesdroppers. This is because K → ∞
increases the probability of choosing a legitimate receiver
as the destination, and thus private information traverses the
channel more frequently. Moreover, J → ∞ increases the
average SNR of eavesdropper j∗, and thus it is able to extract
more information from the channel. This explains why the
average leakage depends on ξ and ˇ and is independent of ˆ.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has revisited previous results on the tradeoffs
between network-state knowledge and the feasibility of se-
crecy [8]. Using such results, a numerical analysis has been
presented to highlight the different behaviors induced by
different individual states at which particular global knowledge
about the network is available. Special attention has been paid
to the impact of the ability of eavesdroppers to report degraded
or improved values of their SNRs on the average secrecy rate
and average information leakage. At each knowledge state,
both the eavesdroppers and the transmitter exhibit significantly
different behaviors, indeed, some of them might appear para-
doxical. In particular, letting eavesdroppers know the number
of legitimate receivers and the total number of eavesdroppers
induces a conservative behavior that makes them less harmful
in terms of average information leakage. Similarly, letting the
transmitter know the number of active eavesdroppers induces
a more careful behavior in which it is less willing to transmit,
which reduces the expected secrecy capacity.
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